With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e., information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model that corresponds to such a setting is the wire tap channel introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this correspondence, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channels. We provide an alternative view of the proof for secrecy capacity of wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide security at rates below secrecy capacity. For the special case of a noiseless main channel and binary erasure channel, we consider encoder and decoder design for codes achieving secrecy on the wiretap channel; we show that it is possible to construct linear-time decodable secrecy codes based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes that achieve secrecy.
. Wire tap channel. the wiretapper's channel. C1 and C2 are assumed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). Suppose Alice and Bob try to (securely) communicate a k-bit message M across C1. Alice encodes M into an n-bit transmitted word X. The legitimate receiver Bob and an eavesdropper Eve receive X through two different channels C1 and C2, respectively. Bob's and Eve's observations are denoted Y and Z, respectively. Alice's encoding should achieve two objectives: 1) [Security] In words, Z should provide no information about M. The precise formulation used in this correspondence is that the rate of mutual information 1 n I(M; Z) ! 0 as n ! 1.2)[Reliability]Y can be decoded into M with negligibly small probability of error. Wyner showed that both objectives can be attained by forward coding without any key bits if the channels C1 and C2 satisfy some conditions. The rate k=n is called the secrecy rate.
Secrecy capacity of a wire tap channel is the largest k=n for which the objectives of secure and reliable communication is achievable. Secrecy capacity is a function of the channels C1 and C2. If the capacity of C1 is greater than the capacity of C2, one would intuitively expect secrecy capacity to be positive. This intuition has been justified in several cases. Wyner [2] showed that if C2 is a degraded version of C1 (C2 is C1 concatenated with another DMC) then secrecy capacity is positive. Csiszár and Körner [3] showed that the secrecy capacity is positive for the cases when C1 is "less noisy" than C2. However, computing secrecy capacity of a general wire tap channel efficiently given DMC's C1 and C2 still remains an unsolved problem. The most recent progress in this problem was made by Van Dijk [4] .
The key distribution problem in wire tap channels, which falls under the general problem of key generation from correlated source outputs, has been studied extensively [5] [6] [7] . The objective of secure key distribution is for Alice and Bob to share a common k-bit key about which Eve's entropy is maximal. In key distribution, the k bits can be unknown to Alice before transmission. Powerful ideas such as common randomness, advantage distillation and privacy amplification were developed in the context of key distribution over wire tap channels [7] , [8] . Several key distribution protocols have been developed and studied; many of the protocols make use of a parallel, error-free public channel between Alice and Bob during implementation.
The problem of developing forward coding schemes (with no parallel channel) for secure communication over wire tap channels has not received much attention. Some examples of coding schemes have been provided in [2] and [5] . A condition for constructing codes for the modified wire tap channel, introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [9] , has been studied by Wei [10] . Code construction methods and their connection to security have not been extensively explored so far. However, existence of coding schemes for various generalized wire tap channel scenarios has been proved by several authors recently [11] [12] [13] . In particular, the existence of coding methods based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes has been shown in [13] .
In this correspondence, we focus on the problem of developing coding schemes for secure communication across wire tap channels.
We begin by discussing the secrecy capacity theorem for certain wire tap channels. We provide a careful reworking of the proof so that the requirements of security and reliability are separated. We generalize an important link between capacity-approaching codes and security. This alternative view of the proof provides a clear construction method for coding schemes for secure communication across arbitrary wire tap channels.
Later, we use this idea to develop codes for different wire tap channels. For a wire tap channel with a noiseless main channel and a binary erasure channel (BEC) as the wire tapper's channel, we provide codes that achieve secrecy capacity using the threshold properties of codes on graphs under message passing decoding. To our knowledge, these are the first codes that achieve secrecy capacity over wire tap channels. Using this construction, we show that it is possible to construct linear-time decodable codes that achieve security over such wire tap channels. Next, we extend the construction to wire tap channels that have BECs as both the main and wiretapper's channel. We show important connections between the threshold of codes on graphs under message-passing decoding and security. Finally, we consider a wire tap channel with a noiseless main channel and a binary symmetric channel (BSC) as the wiretapper's channel. For this case, we provide a coding solution using codes that have good error-detecting capability.
Throughout the correspondence, the criterion for security is that the mutual information between the message and an eavesdropper's observables goes to zero rate-wise. Note that this formulation (originally due to Wyner [2] ) is weaker than the accepted security criteria in contemporary work in cryptography, which typically require the total mutual information to go to zero. Hence, this work can be seen as a conceptual advancement in the area of forward coding for wire tap channels. With future study, stronger security criterion such as exponential fall in mutual information could become possible for such codes over a wire tap channel.
The rest of the correspondence is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly discuss secrecy capacity for wire tap channels and point out the connection between capacity-approaching codes and secrecy. In Section III, we discuss the general coding scheme for wire tap channels used in the remainder of the correspondence. In Section IV, we present codes for wire tap channels with a noiseless main channel and a BEC as the wiretapper's channel; in Section V, we modify the above codes and extend them to construct linear-time decodable codes for these wire tap channels. In Section VI, we present codes for wire tap channels with BEC's as both main and wiretapper's channels. In Section VII, we present code constructions for wire tap channels with a noiseless main channel and a BSC as the wiretapper's channel. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII with a discussion of results and topics for future research.
II. CODING FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL
In a general wire tap channel ( Fig. 1 ), C1 and C2 are discrete memoryless channels (DMC's). The two DMC's have the same input alphabet but different output alphabet. C1 is denoted X ! Y , where X is a random variable denoting an input symbol to C1, and Y is a random variable denoting an output symbol from C1. Similarly, C2 is denoted X ! Z. A sequence of n input symbols is denoted by X n or X. Y n and Y, and Z n and Z have similar notations for the outputs. C1 and C2 of a wire tap channel are called the main channel and wiretapper's channel, respectively.
A. Secrecy Capacity of the Wire Tap Channel
The notion of secrecy capacity, as introduced by Wyner [2] , has an operational meaning of being the maximum possible rate of information transmission between Alice and Bob that still enables Eve to be kept totally ignorant. Before defining the operational meaning precisely, we look at the calculation of secrecy capacity for a given wire tap channel. The secrecy capacity C s for a general wire tap channel can be calculated as follows [3] :
where the inner maximum is over all possible random variables V in joint distribution with X; Y , and Z such that
is a Markov chain. Note that Cs could turn out to be zero in cases where the maximization over V turns out to be negative. At present, the calculation of secrecy capacity is an unsolved problem when C1 and C2 are general DMCs. However, the calculation of secrecy capacity can be simplified for some special cases that impose restrictions on the wire tap channel with respect to the main channel.
the main channel is said to be less noisy than the wire tap channel. If the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel [3] , then
where the maximum is over all possible distributions P X (x) of X .
Moreover, as shown in [4] , I(X; Y ) 0I(X; Z) is a convex function of P X (x) when the main channel is less noisy than the wire tap channel; hence, the secrecy capacity can be calculated using convex optimization methods. It was further shown in [4] that if I(X; Y ) and I(X; Z) are individually maximized by the same P X (x), and the main channel (X ! Y ) is less noisy than the wire tap channel (X ! Z), then
where Capacity( 1 ) refers to the usual channel capacity.
B. Coding Method
The coding problem for Alice in the wire tap channel involves adding redundancy for enabling Bob to correct errors (across the main channel) and adding randomness for keeping Eve ignorant (across the wiretapper's channel). The coding method presented here is not new. It is present in the proofs in [2] and [3] . More recently, similar coding methods have been used in [11] , [12] for finding bounds and error exponents in the context of wire tap channels. However, our method of proof separates the requirements of security and reliability and results in a simple design method for codes over a wire tap channel.
Let us assume that Alice needs to transmit one out of M equally likely messages, i.e., a message denoted u is such that u 2 f1; 2; . . . ; M g and Probfu = ig = 1=M . Alice uses M codes Ci; 1 i M with jCij = L and block-length n. Each codeword of C i consists of n symbols from the input alphabet of the main or wire tap channel. We let the common input alphabet to the two channels be f1;2; . . . ; Kg. A symbol of the input alphabet is denoted k. A message u is encoded into a transmitted word x as follows: x is chosen uniformly at random from the code Cu. The coding method is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The transmitted word x, in general, belongs to the overall code C = [ i C i . The rate of information transmission from Alice to Bob (in terms of bits per channel use) in such a setting is given by log 2 M=n. The receiver on the main channel (Bob) decodes a received word y with respect to the overall code C into a decoded messageû (say, by maximum-likelihood (MaxL) decoding).
The objective of Alice and Bob in a wire tap channel can now be given a precise definition. Let U;Û, and Z be random variables denoting Alice's message, Bob's decoded message, and Eve's received word, respectively. Let H(V ) represent the entropy of a random variable V . Then, the objective is to achieve the following:
The constraint (5) is referred to as the security constraint, while (4) is called the reliability constraint. If an encoder (as in Fig. 2 ) with R s = log 2 M=n satisfies the security and reliability constraints for a given wire tap channel, then such an encoder is said to achieve a secrecy rate R s .
C. Security of the Coding Method
The security constraint is of paramount importance in the design of an encoder for a wire tap channel. The following choice of the codes Cu satisfies the security constraint: Each Cu should approach capacity over the wire tapper's channel (similar to the special case considered by Wyner in [2] ). We present the criterion in the following theorem (the notation used is from Fig. 2 and Section II-B).
Theorem 1: If each code Cu; u 2 f1; 2; . . . ; M g comes from a sequence of codes that approach capacity asymptotically over the wire tap channel, then I(U; Z)=n ! 0, as n ! 1.
Proof: Since each Cu approaches the capacity Cw of the wire tapper's channel, we have for any > 0 an n such that for n > n ; I(X; ZjU = u)=n C W 0 for each u. Therefore for n > n; I(X; ZjU)=n CW 0 .
Expanding I(Z; UX) in two ways, we get I(Z; UX) = I(U; Z) + I(X; ZjU) = I(X; Z) + I(U; ZjX): Since U ! X ! Z is a Markov chain, I(U; ZjX) = 0. Therefore for n > n we have I(U; Z)=n = I(X; Z)=n 0 I(X; ZjU)=n CW 0 (CW 0 ) = :
This fundamental connection between capacity-approaching codes and secrecy has been used in many works on wire tap channels beginning with [2] implicitly. In Appendix A, we show that this connection can be used to design codes that approach the secrecy capacity of certain wire tap channels. Particularly, we have shown that the reliability condition can be satisfied while simultaneously forcing each code C u to approach capacity.
In summary, we have shown that secrecy capacity can be achieved for certain wire tap channels using codes that achieve capacity over the wire tapper's channel. A significant drawback is that capacityachieving codes are essential for guaranteeing the security of the method. Since capacity-achieving codes are not practical in many settings, design of practical codes that are secure is an important problem that needs to be addressed. If the resulting code is practical and secure, transmission rates below secrecy capacity are certainly acceptable. The remainder of this correspondence is concerned with developing practical codes and protocols for wire tap channels. In some simple settings, practical methods that achieve secrecy capacity are given.
III. CODE DESIGN FOR THE WIRE TAP CHANNEL
In this section, we study the design and use of linear codes over a wire tap channel. We use a method that was first introduced and studied by Wyner and Ozarow [2] , [9] for two specific cases. We have extended Wyner's study by considering other wire tap channels. We have also provided better, implementable codes for the cases studied by Wyner.
A. Coding Method
We consider a coding method similar to Fig. 2 but with linear codes and cosets. To transmit k-bit messages, we first select a (n; l) linear binary code C such that k n 0 l. Out of the 2 n0l cosets of C, we choose 2 k cosets and let each message correspond to a chosen coset. The selection of the cosets is done in a linear fashion. Suppose G is a generator matrix for C with rows g 1 ; g 2 ; . . ., and g l . We select k linearly independent vectors h1;h2; . . ., and h k from f0; 1g n n C. The coset corresponding to a k-bit message s = [s1 s2 1 11s k ] is determined as follows: s ! s1h1 + s2h2 + 111 + s k h k + C:
Though the above correspondence is deterministic, the encoding procedure has a random component in the selection of the transmitted word.
A k-bit message s is encoded into a n-bit word randomly selected from the coset of C corresponding to s. Hence, the transmitted word, x, is
given by x = s 1 h 1 + s 2 h 2 + 11 1 + s k h k + v 1 g 1 + v 2 g 2 + 11 1 + v l g l ; where v = [v1 v2 111 v l ] is an uniformly random l-bit vector. The overall encoding operation can be described as a matrix multiplication. Let G 3 be the k 2 n matrix with rows h 1 ; h 2 ; . . ., and h k . Then,
Hence, x belongs to the code
The goal of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is to determine s from their respective received vectors. Restating the conditions of Section II.B, the design of the codes C and C should be such that (1) s can be determined without error across the main channel, and (2) every s is equally likely across the wiretapper's channel.
Guided by the results of the previous sections, we could choose C as a capacity-achieving code over the wiretapper's channel. However, designing a code C that can be decoded across the main channel is still a challenge. Moreover, capacity-achieving codes have not yet been demonstrated in practice for many channels. In the following sections, we look at some design approaches for some simple wire tap channels. The encoding method and notation will remain the same for all cases.
IV. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
We begin with the simplest possible wire tap channel with a binary erasure channel (BEC) as the wiretapper's channel and a noiseless main channel. This scenario is shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , the wiretapper's channel has been denoted BEC(1 0 ) i.e., the probability of erasure in the wiretapper's channel is 1 0. The probability that a bit is leaked to the wiretapper is . This notation has been chosen for future convenience. We will denote the wire tap channel of Fig. 3 as EWT(). Using (3), we see that the secrecy capacity of an EWT() is Cs = 1 0 Capacity(BEC(1 0 )) = 1 0 (1 0 (1 0 )) = 1 0 :
The coding method across an EWT() is illustrated in Fig. 4 . In the figure, S is the random variable denoting the k-bit message to be trans- mitted. The code C is chosen to be an (n; n0k) code, and the code C is chosen to be the entire vector space f0; 1g n . The transmitted n-tuple is denoted by the random variable X = [X1 X2 11 1Xn]. Note that the message S can be seen as a syndrome of C with respect to a carefully constructed k 2 n parity-check matrix H . Since the channel between Alice and Bob is error-free, Bob finds the message as follows: S = HX T (mod 2). The secret information rate is R = k=n. From (7) , we see that for secure transmission R = k=n < 1 0 :
Assuming that all messages are equally likely, we have X i = 0 or X i = 1 with probability 1=2 each. The eavesdropper learns X i with probability . That is, the random variable Z = [Z1 Z2 1 11Zn] is such that Z i = X i with probability , and Z i =? (unknown or erasure) with probability 1 0 .
A. Security Criterion
To develop a security criterion for the choice of C, we calculate the eavesdropper's uncertainty H(S j Z) by first evaluating H(SjZ = z).
Note that the eavesdropper is given complete knowledge of the code C and infinite computational power. The main source of uncertainty is the uniformly random selection of the transmitted word X from the coset of C corresponding to the message S. If a coset of C contains at least one vector that agrees with z 2 f0; 1; ?g n in the unerased positions, we say that the coset is consistent with z. Each consistent coset corresponds to a possible message for the eavesdropper. Let v be a vector consistent with z in the coset v + C. Let S be the set of all vectors in v + C consistent with z. Then, v + S is the set of all vectors in C with zeros in the positions revealed in z.
That is v + S = fu 2 C : u i = 0 whenever z i 6 =?g:
Since jSj = jv + Sj, the number of vectors consistent with z in each consistent coset is a constant equal to the size of the set on the RHS above.
Let N(C; z) denote the total number of cosets of C consistent with z. Since each message is equally likely a priori, we get H(S j Z = z) = log 2 N(C; z): (9) For an (n; n 0k) code C, the maximum possible value for N(C; z)
is the total number of cosets 2 k . If N(C; z) = 2 k , we say that z is secured by C since the eavesdropper's ProbfS = sjZ = zg = 1=2 k for every possible message s. The following theorem (adapted from [9, Lemma 3]) states a condition for a vector z to be secured by a code C. Theorem 2 (Ozarow, Wyner'84) : Let an (n; n 0 k) code C have a generator matrix G = [a 1 11 1a n ], where a i is the ith column of G. Consider an instance of the eavesdropper's observation z 2 f0; 1; ?g n with unerased positions given by fi : z i 6 =?g = fi 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i g. z is secured by C iff the matrix G = [ai ai 111 ai ] has rank .
Proof: If G has rank , the code C has all 2 possible -tuples in the unerased positions. So each coset of C also has all 2 possible -tuples in the revealed positions. So N(C; z) = 2 k . If G has rank less than , the code C does not have all -tuples in the unerased positions. So there exists at least one coset that does not contain a given -tuple in the unerased positions, and N(C; z) < 2 k .
If a random vector obtained over a BEC(1 0) is secured with probability close to one by an (n; n 0 k) code C, rate k=n is achievable with secrecy over an EWT().
B. Using Duals of Codes on Graphs
We now study the use of the threshold property of codes on graphs for providing security over an erasure wire tap channel. We illustrate the method using LDPC codes. The extension to other codes on graphs is shown in examples.
Consider a bipartite graph ensemble C n (; ) with n left nodes and left and right edge degree distribution polynomials (x) = i1 i x i01 and (x) = i1 i x i01 , respectively [14] . The coefficients i (respectively, i) denotes the probability that a randomly chosen edge in the Tanner graph of the code is incident on a variable (respectively, check) node of degree i. The adjacency matrix of a graph from the ensemble provides the parity-check matrix of a LDPC code. Let the threshold for C n (; ) over the binary erasure channel be 3 (; ). The threshold property has the following straightforward interpretation.
Theorem 3: Let M be a parity-check matrix of an LDPC code from the ensemble C n (; ). A submatrix formed by selecting columns of M independently with probability will have full column rank for < 3 (; ) for large k with high probability.
Theorem 3 enables the use of duals of LDPC codes as the code C over an EWT() as shown in Fig. 4 . We let a matrix M from the ensemble C n (; ) to be the generator matrix for C. By Theorem 3, the columns of the matrix M corresponding to the leaked bits over a BEC(1 0 ) will have full rank with high probability whenever < 3 (; ). Note that the probability that a bit is leaked across a BEC(1 0 ) is equal to . In combination with Theorem 2, we see that the code C with generator matrix M provides complete security with probability tending to one for large block-length over an EWT() with < 3 (; ). M is an n=2 2 n binary matrix with row weight 3 and column weight 6. The (n; n=2) code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT() for < 0:42 with secrecy. The information rate between the honest parties in this case is R = 0:5 compared to the upper bound of 1 0 = 0:58 (from (8)). (In practice, the value of could be reasonably lesser than 0:42 for added security.)
The above argument can be extended to other ensembles of codes on graphs that have capacity-achieving thresholds over the binary erasure channel. We illustrate the method with the following example.
Example 2 (Tornado Codes):
A rate-2=3 tornado code ensemble with threshold = 0:33257 has been reported in [15] . A parity-check matrix M for a code from the ensemble will have dimensions n=32n. The (n; n02=3n) code C with generator matrix M can be used over an EWT() for < 0:33257 with secrecy. The information rate between the honest parties in this case is R = 2=3 = 0:66666 . . . Similar examples using the other classes of capacity-approaching ensembles can be constructed. Hence, over an erasure wire-tap channel with wire-tap probability , secure information transmission rates tending to the upper bound of 1 0 are achievable using duals of codes on graphs that approach capacity over the binary erasure channel.
Note that the code C has properties that are opposite to the requirements of Section II-B. While we had proposed to use a code that is capacity-achieving over the wiretapper's channel in Section II-B, we have used the dual of a capacity-achieving code when the wiretapper's channel is a BEC. In fact, using the dual appears to be a more powerful method since security does not depend on capacity-achieving codes. This observation agrees with the results of [9] , and both possibilities are worth exploring in other wire tap channels.
V. EFFICIENTLY DECODABLE SECRECY CODES FOR NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAP CHANNEL SYSTEMS
The main advantage of using LDPC codes for error correction over binary erasure channels is that the decoding algorithm is of linear complexity in blocklength [14] . This property can be extended to the use of LDPC codes over the erasure wire tap channels as well. We now discuss designing linear-time decodable secrecy codes for the system shown in Fig. 3 , where the main channel is noiseless and the wiretap channel is a BEC.
In the previous section, we showed how to use dual codes of LDPC codes to construct secrecy codes for this system. The cosets of a dual code of an LDPC code are used to send secret messages. Let C be a rate-r, length-n LDPC code. Let G be a generator matrix of C ? , i.e., a parity check matrix of C. Since C is an LDPC code, the matrix G will be sparse. As discussed in the previous sections, a coset of C is indexed by a secret message S and the transmitted word X is a randomly chosen word from that coset. Suppose G has rows g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g n(10r) . We select nr linearly independent vectors h1; h2; . . . ; hnr from f0; 1g n n C ? . Let G 3 be the matrix with rows as h 1 ; h 2 ; . . ., and h nr . In Fig.  5 , we show the matrices G and G 3 , and the method for encoding an nr-bit secret message. The secret bits are S = [s 1 s 2 11 1s nr ], and the bits V = [v 1 111 v n(10r) ] are chosen at random. The transmitted bits are X = [x1 x2 111 xn]. We refer to the secret bits, random bits and transmitted bits as s-bits, v-bits and x-bits, respectively.
We now consider the decoding problem for Bob. Letting W = [S V], the encoding from Fig. 5 can be written as
Since X is received error-free by Bob, the decoding problem is to determine W (or just S) from (10); this can be easily seen to be a O(n 2 ) operation. An equivalent way of finding S is to compute the syndrome HX T for a suitable choice of a parity-check matrix H of C ? . However, since H is a dense matrix (in general), the complexity of this decoding is also likely to be O(n 2 ).
We now ask the following question. Is it possible to achieve linear or almost-linear decoding complexity for Bob by carefully choosing a subset of the set of all the cosets of C? In other words, can we sacrifice some secrecy rate to achieve linear or almost-linear decoding complexity for Bob? As we will discuss later, our approach will be to make some of the elements of S always equal to zero. This will decrease our secrecy rate, but we will show that almost-linear or linear time decoding becomes possible in that case.
We first show that the decoding problem in (10) 
Equation (10) is similar to (11) if we let X T = 0H1m T ; H2 = [G 3T G T ], and W = p. In [14] , the authors have shown how to efficiently solve (11) for LDPC codes. As in [14] , our approach will be to multiply (10) by a matrix Q to get
QX T = Q[G 3T G T ]W T :
Finding W from the above equation will be a O(n) operation if the matrix Q[G 3T ; G T ] is in a special form. In addition, we need to ensure that QX T is a O(n) operation.
A. Choosing a Subset of the Set of Cosets
Let G 1 be a sparse, full row-rank matrix whose rows form a set of linearly independent vectors in the row-space of G 3 . Let G 1 have dimensions n(r 0t)2n for 0 t < r < 1. Let P be the matrix whose rows are the rest of the independent vectors in f0; 1g n . We show the modi- and
See Appendix B for a proof of the above relations. As shown in Note that, after row and column permutations, we need to rearrange the v-bits, s-bits and x-bits. To keep the notation simple we will still call the first n(1 0 r) bits v-bits and the next n(r 0 t) bits as s-bits with the understanding that Bob now will possibly have to find some or all of the bits in not only S, but also in V. After the row and column permutations we continue to call the matrices G; G1 and P by the same names. where the matrix H is obtained by rotating the matrix H1 by 90 clockwise. In Fig. 8 , we illustrate (14) , which needs to be solved for the s-bits and the v-bits. Note that we have retained only n(1 0t) bits from X in the RHS of the equation in Fig. 8 . Since H has full row rank (because H 1 in the previous section had full-column rank), n(1 0 t) x-bits are enough to solve for the v-bits and the s-bits. We denote this new vector on the RHS in Fig. 8 as X 3T . We remark that the matrix H is neither the generator matrix of the code C nor the parity check matrix of C ? .
We will now basically follow the steps described in [14] for efficiently solving the equation in Fig. 8 . The matrix H can be divided into matrices B; T; D and E as in [14] (the matrices called A and C in [14] are not necessary in our solution) with dimensions n 2 n(1 0 t 0); n 2n; n(1 0t0)2n(10t0) and n(1 0t0)2n, respectively. T is a lower triangular matrix.
3) Multiplying by the Matrix Q:
As in [14] , we multiply both sides in Fig. 8 by the matrix Q shown in Fig. 9 .
The multiplication on the LHS results in
which can be precomputed before the actual decoding begins. On the RHS, we perform the multiplication QX 3T for each received vector. So, we will have to show that the multiplication QX 3T requires O(n)
operations. Splitting the vector X 3 = [x1 x2 11 1x n(10t) ] into vectors 
4) Solving for Vectors S and V:
We now turn to (15) for computing U, which leads to the computation of S and V. Let the first n(10t0) elements of the vector U = [s n(r0t) 111s 1 v n(10r) 111 v 1 ] be denoted by U1, and the next n elements be denoted by U2. Hence, U = [U 1 U 2 ]. To compute S and V, we now need to solve for U 1 and U 2 .
Using (15), we get
Solving (17), we get
Though the inverse can be precomputed, the multiplication with Y 2 is not O(n) (in general), since (ET 01 B + D) 01 is not sparse anymore.
The complexity of this multiplication is O((1 0 t 0 ) 2 n 2 ). However, if = 10 t, the vector U 1 is empty and does not have to be computed.
To solve for U 2 , we use (16) to get T U 2 T = Y 1 T + BU 1 T :
Since B is a sparse matrix, BU 1 T can be computed in linear time, and then U 2 can be computed in O(n) time by back-substitution, since T is a sparse lower triangular matrix. If = 10 t the complexity of the entire decoding operation reduces to O(n). Hence, if the code C 3 is a capacity-achieving erasure-correcting code, then linear time decoding is possible. As we will discuss in the next section, this is a sufficient condition but not necessary. We now conclude this section with an example of a secrecy code decoded using the method described in this section.
Example 3: Let C be a (3; 6)-regular LDPC code with block-length n. Let G be the sparse parity check matrix of C (i.e., the generator matrix of C ? ). The rate of C is r = 1=2. The matrix G 1 is chosen to be the parity check matrix of a (2; 6)-regular LDPC code. Then the code C 3 is a regular LDPC code with variable-node degree 5 and check-node degree 6. The rate of C 3 is t = 1=6. The LDPC code C has an erasure threshold 0:42. The code C 3 has an erasure threshold 0:55. Thus, the secrecy rate is r 0 t = 1=3, and 1 0 t 0 0:283. The decoding complexity is O(n 2 ) because of a multiplication in the decoder by a 0:283n20:283n nonsparse matrix; however, this multiplication is still less complex than a direct decoder that would require a n 2n nonsparse matrix multiplication. The transmitted message is secure across the wiretap channel having erasure probability at least (10 ) = 0:58.
B. Linear Time Decodable Secrecy Codes
As we saw in the previous sections, a sufficient condition for the secrecy code to be linear-time decodable is that the code C 3 in Fig. 6 (with parity check matrix H 3 ) should be a capacity-achieving code on a binary erasure channel so that the row gap in H 3 (i.e., (1 0t0)) is zero. The authors in [14] have shown that the row gap can also be calculated using the erasure threshold of the transpose of the parity check matrix (H 3 ). The transpose of H 3 does not correspond to a nonzero rate code. Nevertheless, the greedy algorithm that is used to get approximate triangulation in H 3 can also be thought to be the standard iterative erasure decoding algorithm operating on the transpose of H 3 . Let H 3 have degree distribution (H ; H ), where H and H correspond to the variable and the check nodes, respectively. Then, the transpose of H 3 will have a degree distribution ( H ; H ). In [14] , it is shown that the row gap obtained is then (1 0 t 0 ), where is the erasure threshold of the degree distribution pair ( H ; H ). It turns out that many of the known degree distributions of good LDPC error correcting codes actually allow linear time encoding i.e., (1 0 t 0 ) is zero.
In the following example, we will use this idea to construct a secrecy code that allows linear-time decoding (and encoding since G; G 1 in Fig. 6 are sparse anyway). Since some matrices in our example have a few degree-zero variable nodes, we will use node-based degree distributions as opposed to the typical edge-based degree distribution. Given an edge-based degree distribution ((x); (x)), let v(x) denote the node-based degree distribution of the variable nodes. The coefficient
Example 4: We refer to Fig. 6 for this example. Let the code C (with parity check matrix G) have degree distributions ( G ; G ), where G (x) = 0:6087x + 0:3913x 2 , and G (x) = x 6 . Thus, the variable degree distribution, vG(x) = 0:7x 2 + 0:3x 3 . Let the matrix G 1 correspond to the parity check matrix of a code with degree distributions (vG ; G ), where vG (x) = 0:7 + 0:3x, and G (x) = x 6 . Hence, the degree distributions of H 3 is ( H ; H ), where H (x) = 0:3769x + 0:4846x 2 + 0:1385x 3 , and H (x) = x 6 (using (12) and (13)). The rate of the secrecy code then is r( G ; G ) 0 r(v H ; H ) = 0:0429, where r denotes the rate of the corresponding LDPC code. Hence, our secrecy rate has dropped to 0:0429 from 1 0 (1 0 r(G; G)) = 0:6714. The erasure threshold of C turns out to be 0:2625. Hence this code is secure on a wiretap channel with erasure probability at least (1 0 0:2625) = 0:7375 (i.e., secrecy capacity is 0:7375). This secrecy code is linear time decodable. Fig. 10 . The BEC wire tap system.
VI. ERASURE MAIN CHANNEL AND ERASURE WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider wire tap systems where both the wire tap channel and the main channel are binary erasure channels (BEC). Though our results apply (with a small modification) to systems with DMCs other than the BEC as the main channel, we restrict ourselves to the BEC case for ease of explanation.
With a BEC as the main channel, the wire tap system is as shown in Fig. 10 . The wiretapper's channel is a BEC with erasure probability w, and the main channel is another BEC with erasure probability m.
According to (3), the secrecy capacity of this system is C s = w 0 m , which is positive whenever w > m .
A. Using Duals of Codes on Graphs
As in the noiseless main channel case, we consider using the dual of an LDPC code as the code C for encoding. Using Theorem 3, security across the wiretapper's channel can be related to the threshold of the LDPC code C ? over erasure channels. Specifically, if 1 0 w < , security is guaranteed with high probability.
We now turn to the probability of error on the main channel. Suppose we could design the matrix G 3 such that the overall code C still belongs to an LDPC ensemble with threshold over erasure channels.
Bob can decode x (and hence the message s) with asymptotically zero probability of error whenever m < .
In summary, the requirement on the LDPC code C is that it should contain C, the dual of another LDPC code C ? . Since the dual of an LDPC code is likely to have a significantly high number of low-weight codewords, the requirement appears to be contrary to intuition. A very similar code design problem arises in the construction of quantum error-correcting codes using sparse graphs [16] . After studying several constructions, the authors of [16] conclude that such codes are difficult to construct and are unlikely to have high thresholds.
B. Using Capacity-Achieving Codes
We now consider a coding method that will eventually depend on capacity-achieving codes for complete security. Let us select fractions r 1 ; r 2 ; 3 m and 3 w such that m 3 m 1 0 r2 w 3 w 1 0 r1: Let H 1 be a n(1 0 r 1 ) 2 n LDPC matrix that corresponds to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair ( 1 ; 1 ). Let C 1 be the rate-r 1 code with parity-check matrix H1. We select n(1 0 r2) rows of H1 to form a n(1 0 r 2 ) 2 n matrix H 2 . The rest of the rows of H 1 form a n(r 2 0 r 1 ) 2 n matrix H 2 . Let C 2 denote the rate-r 2 LDPC code with paritycheck matrix H2. Let H2 correspond to a Tanner graph with degree distribution pair ( 2 ; 2 ), and let H 2 correspond to a Tanner graph with Fig. 11 . The encoding procedure. degree distribution pair ( 2 ; 2 ). Since H 1 = H2 H2 , using (12) and (13), we get that 1) Encoding Procedure: We now discuss the encoding procedure, which is a little different from the encoding procedure for a noiseless main channel. Here, Alice starts with a n(r 2 0 r 1 )-bit message vector S, and forms a n(10r 1 )-bitvector [01110S] by prefixing n(10r 2 )0's to S. She now chooses, for transmission, a vector X at random from the solution set of the equation 
We illustrate this encoding procedure in Fig. 11 .
The number of solutions to the equation H2X T = 0 is 2 n0n(10r ) = 2 nr . For a particular choice of S = S 1 , the number of solutions to (21) is 2 n0n(10r ) = 2 nr . In addition, the solution sets of (21) for different values of S are disjoint as illustrated in Fig. 12 . Therefore, the solution space of the equation H 2 X T = 0 splits into 2 2 = 2 n(r 0r ) disjoint subsets, each corresponding to a different value of S. Hence, the rate of the secrecy code is (r2 0 r1).
An interesting observation in the encoding process is that we are not using the entire space f0; 1g n as in the previous sections where the main channel was noiseless.
2) Equivocation Across the Wiretapper's Channel: Since Eve's channel is a BEC with erasure probability w, with probability tending to 1, Eve will have nw erasures as n ! 1. Hence, the equation H 2 X T = 0 has 2 n( 0(10r )) solutions for X (note that we require w (1 0 r2)). All these solutions will be equally likely and differ from each other in the erased positions. Since 3 w is the erasure threshold of the code C 1 with parity-check matrix H 1 , any submatrix formed using nw columns of H1 will have full column rank for Eve is then 1 = n(w 0 (10 r2)). If C1 is a capacity-achieving code on an erasure channel with erasure probability w , we have 10r 1 = w implying 1 = n(r 2 0 r 1 ), and the message will be completely secure from Eve.
3) Probability of Error on the Main Channel: When Bob receives a vector Y, he first decodes it by using the standard iterative erasure decoding technique for LDPC codes on the Tanner graph of the code C 2 . If the erasure probability of the main channel m 3 m , he will be able to recover the transmitted word X as n ! 1 with probability tending to 1. Bob then can compute the product H 2 X T , which is his estimate of the message S.
We now illustrate the codes involved in this coding method with an example.
Example 5: Let C2 be a (3; 6)-regularLDPC code with block-length n. Hence, 2 (x) = x 2 and 2 (x) = x 5 . C 2 has rate r 2 = 1=2. The code C 1 is chosen to be another LDPC code with all variable nodes having degree 5 and all check nodes having degree 6. Hence, 1(x) = x 4 and 1 (x) = x 5 . C 1 has rate r 1 = 1=6. It can be seen from (19) and (20) that, 2 (x) = x and 2 (x) = x 5 . The LDPC code C 2 has an erasure threshold 3 0:42. The code C1 has an erasure threshold 3 0:55. Thus, the secrecy rate is r 2 0 r 1 = 1=3, and an equivocation of n( 3 0 (1 0 r2)) = 0:05n is guaranteed across the wiretap channel having erasure probability greater than 3 = 0:55. Bob can decode the message with asymptotically zero probability of error on the main channel having erasure probability at most 3 = 0:42.
The example above illustrates the main drawback of this coding method. Unless the code C1 is capacity-achieving ( 3 = 1 0 r1), the coding method is not secure even for large n. The equivocation could be reduced further by a better choice of C 1 , but the equivocation will go to zero only for capacity-achieving codes.
C. Remarks
We have shown that codes on graphs provide secrecy in erasure wire tap channels with maximum possible secure information rate. The codes are efficiently implementable in practice. However, if the main channel is not noiseless, secrecy by forward coding alone appears to require capacity-achieving codes that are difficult to construct. Alternative models of wire tap channels with parallel error-free public channels are presumably better for constructing implementable secrecy codes when the main channel is noisy.
The coding method presented in Section VI can be readily used over a wiretap channel system with a BEC as the wiretapper's channel and an arbitrary channel (over which a threshold for LDPC codes exists) as the main channel.
VII. NOISELESS MAIN CHANNEL AND BSC WIRETAPPER'S CHANNEL
In this section, we consider a special case of a wire tap channel, where the eavesdropper sees a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with error probability p, denoted BSC(p). The main channel is error free.
Using (3), we see that C s = 1 0 Capacity(BSC(p)) = 1 0 (1 0 h(p)) = h(p) (22) where h(x) = 0x log 2 x 0 (1 0 x) log 2 (1 0 x); 0 x 1.
The wire tap channel and the encoding are shown in Fig. 13 . The method of coding is illustrated with the same notation as Section III.
A. Security Across a BSC Wiretapper's Channel
We let C be an (n; n0k) code and C be the entire space f0; 1g n . For an arbitrary k-bit message S = s, the transmitted word X 2 sG 3 + C.
Since the cosets of C cover the entire space of n-tuples, Eve's received vector Z belongs to some coset of C, say uG 3 + C. If e denotes the error vector introduced by the BSC(p) in the wiretap, we have for 1 i 2 k ProbfZ 2 uG 3 + CjS = sg = Probfe 2 (u + s)G 3 + Cg = Probfe 2 w + Cg for some n 0 tuple w: (23)
We can now state the criterion for selecting the code C to guarantee security of the message S: we choose C such that for any n-tuple w, we have Probfe 2 w + Cg ! 2 0k ; as n ! 1:
Using the above condition in (23), we see that Eve is equally likely to find Z in any coset of C given any message S = s. Assuming all S = s are equally likely a priori, ProbfZ 2 uG 3 +Cg is independent of u; hence, ProbfS = s j Z 2 uG 3 + Cg ! 2 0k , and security is guaranteed.
The LHS of (24) is the probability of the coset w + C. This probability was first studied by Sullivan [17] and further extended by Ancheta [18] , [19] . The following results can be extracted from their studies: 1) The requirement of (24) that the probabilities of a code (w = 0) and a coset (w 6 = 0) should be approximately equal can be achieved for large block-length.
2) The properties of the dual of a code play an important role in the probability of a coset. We expand on these two results in the next sections to design codes for the BSC wire tap channel.
B. Choosing the Code C: Security Criterion
Using the MacWilliams identities [20, p. 127] 
From (27), we see that jA 0 i (w)j A 0 i . We now state the main security criterion as a theorem.
A 0 i (1 0 2p) i ! 0; as n ! 1 (29) then Probfe 2 w + Cg ! 2 0k for all n-tuples w. Proof:
That implies that the second term in the RHS of (28) can be neglected with respect to the first term 2 0k , and the proof is complete. The criterion for the selection of C is that the dual C ? should have a weight distribution that satisfies (29) .
C. Some Code Constructions
We provide some examples of codes that satisfy the requirement of (29).
Example 6: (Single parity check codes) The dual of a (n; n 0 1; 2) single parity check code is the (n; 1; n) repetition code with weight distribution A 0 0 = 1 and A 0 n = 1. Hence n i=1 A 0 i (1 0 2p) i = (1 0 2p) n ! 0 as n ! 1. However, the secrecy rate 1=n ! 0 for large n. This is an example that was first used by Wyner in [2] to motivate coding over a wire tap channel. as n ! 1. As in the previous example, the secrecy rate tends to zero for large n.
The following theorem generalizes the above construction method.
Theorem 5: Let fC (n) g be a sequence of (n; n 0 k n ) codes such that ProbfDetection Errorg 2 0k over a BSC(p); 0 p 1=2 and limn!1fkn=ng < log 2 (1=(1 0 p) ). Let A 0 i be the number of codewords of weight i in the dual code C ? (n) . Then Since limn!1fkn=ng < log 2 (1=(1 0p)) and the LHS above is nonnegative n i=1 A 0 i (1 0 2p) i ! 0; as n ! 1:
The existence of (n; n 0 kn) linear codes with probability of detection error less than 2 0k is well known [ Then, for large n, the code C (n) , when used as the code C over a wire tap channel with a BSC(p) as the wiretapper's channel, provides security whenever R < 0 log 2 (1 0 p), or p > 1 0 2 0R . The maximum possible secrecy rate that can be achieved by this construction is therefore 0 log 2 (1 0 p).
Codes such as Hamming codes and double error-correcting BCH codes are examples of such error-detecting codes. However, most known classes of such codes have R = 0.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this correspondence, we have studied the construction of codes that provide security and reliability over a wire tap channel. Our general construction uses codes that approach capacity over the wire tapper's channel. We have shown that this approach achieves secrecy capacity when the wire tap channel is made of symmetric DMC's. Other cases require a closer study.
A drawback of using capacity-achieving codes is that they are difficult to find and construct except in some special cases. One such special case is when the wire tap channel is a binary erasure channel. Hence, codes such as optimized Tornado codes can be used across erasure wiretapper's channels as described above. However, we have shown that capacity-achieving codes are not necessary in this case. If a code exhibits a threshold behavior across a BEC (codes such as regular LDPC codes), its dual can be used effectively over a wire tap channel with a BEC as the wiretapper's channel. This result enables the use of codes that can be more easily constructed. Extending the connections between codes that exhibit a threshold phenomenon and secrecy over a general DMC is an important area of future work.
When the wiretapper's channel is a BEC and the main channel is noiseless, we have presented codes that approach secrecy capacity. To our knowledge these are the first and only such codes.
For the case where both the main channel and the wiretapper's channel are BECs, we have studied two approaches for code design. The optimality and secrecy capacity of the constructions need to be studied and explored.
For the case where the wiretapper's channel is a BSC(p) and the main channel is noiseless, we have shown that codes with good errordetecting properties provide security. The capacity of this construction is 0 log 2 (10p), which is less than the secrecy capacity h(p). Capacityapproaching codes will probably be graph-based. Use of graph-based codes for the BSC wiretapper's channel is a subject for future study.
APPENDIX A EXISTENCE OF RELIABLE ENCODERS
In this section, we determine a random coding bound on the probability of error ProbfU 6 =Ûg in a manner following Gallager [22, Section 5.6] . Let x be a vector of n input symbols, y a vector of n main channel output symbols, and z a vector of n wire tap channel output symbols. We let the output alphabet of the main channel be f1; 2; . . . ; J m g denoting a symbol by j m . The eavesdropper on the wire tap channel is assumed to have unlimited power to process the received word z. We let the output alphabet of the wire tap channel be f1; 2; . . . ; J w g denoting a symbol by j w . Let T n (yjx) and S n (zjx) be the transition probabilities for the main channel and wire tap channel, respectively. Let T S n (y; zjx) be the joint distribution.
We now define a random code ensemble for the coding method of Section II-B. Let Qn(x) be an arbitrary probability assignment on the set of length n input sequences. A set of M L words is chosen pairwise independently from the set of length n input sequences according to Let us assume that a message u is to be transmitted by Alice. Let us further assume that the word xm with m = (u; v) is chosen for transmission from Cu . Let y and z be the received vectors for Bob and Eve, respectively. We will upper bound the probability of an event E , which captures both the security and reliability constraints. The event E is the union of the following two events. : (33) Note that the secrecy rate of a code from the ensemble is Rs = R1 0 R 2 . Using a distribution Prfmg in (31), we get P E expf0n[E 1 ( 1 ; Q) 0 1 R 1 ]g + expf0n[E 2 ( 2 ; Q) 0 2 R 2 ]g (34) The random coding exponent for the wire tap channel is defined as follows:
1) Event
E w (R 2 ) = max 0 1 max Q [E 2 ( 2 ; Q) 0 2 R 2 ]:
Let Q 2 be the distribution on the input symbols that maximizes the random coding exponent E w (R 2 ). To satisfy the security constraint of Section II-C, we restrict ourselves to ensemble of codes with input symbol distribution Q 2 (k). We can now define another random coding exponent for the main channel as follows:
E m (R 1 ) = max 0 1 [E 1 ( 1 ; Q 2 ) 0 1 R 1 ]:
Using the random coding exponents in (34), we get the following theorem. We know that E w (R 2 ) > 0 for 0 R 2 < C w , where C w is the channel capacity of the wiretapper's channel. Hence, Theorem 6 says that there exists a code in a suitable ensemble such that the security constraint can be satisfied (each Cu can approach capacity on the wire tapper's channel) with arbitrary accuracy by increasing the block-length; at the same time, the same code can satisfy the reliability constraint with arbitrary accuracy provided the rate R1 is such that E m (R 1 ) > 0. From the properties of random coding exponents ([22, Sec. 5.6], we see that E m (R 1 ) > 0 if R 1 < I(Q 2 ; S) = K k=1 J j=1 Q 2 (k)S(j w j k) log S(jw j k) i Q2(i)S(jw j i) :
Hence, the maximum secrecy rate achievable by a code from the ensemble is I(Q 2 ; S)0C w . We immediately see that for the special case Let E1 and E2 be the total number of 1's in the matrices G and G 1 , respectively. From the definition of degree distribution, the number of 1's in G and G 1 from rows of weight i equals i E 1 and 1i E 2 , respectively. Therefore, 3i (fraction of 1's in H 3 from rows of weight i) is given by
The number of weight i columns in G and G1 equals i E1 and i E2, respectively. The total number of columns in G or G 1 ; n, can be written as n = i i i E1 = i 1i i E2:
Using the above relations in (36) for E1 and E2 and replacing i i (respectively, i i ) with 1 0 G (x)dx (respectively, 1 0 G (x)dx), we get (13) .
To prove (12) 
equals the probability that a randomly chosen column of G 1 has weight i. Note that the polynomials in (37) and (38) are generating functions of independent random variables denoting the weight of a randomly chosen column in G and G 1 , respectively. Since the weight of a column of H 3 equals the sum of the weight of the column in G and the weight of the column in G1 and the two weights in G and G1 are independent,
we have 
